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of priming 
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Nijmegen, The Netherlands 
Abstract 
The present study investigates the effect of priming on the me of social categorizations. 
Using sex and race as stimulus categorizations, previous studies failed to confirm the 
hypothesis that priming one of the two available categorizations would enhance the use of 
the primed categorization relation to the not-primed categorization. As suggested by 
Stangor, Lynch, Duan and Glass (1992). a momentary increase in accessibility may be 
insufficient to further enhance the use of highly accessible categorizations like race and 
sex, but it may be expected that priming will increase the use of categorizations which are 
less habitually used in daily life- The results of the present experiment support the 
hypothesis that, when the stimulus categorizations are weakly accessible (university 
major, university town), the relative use of the previously primed categorizations does 
indeed increase, compared to the alternative, not-primed, categorization. 
INTRODUCTION 
Theoretically, it may be argued that the use of social categorizations in information 
processing may be affected by subtle cues in the prior context. Priming of category 
labels can be considered as a way to enhance the recency of activation and hence the 
situational accessibility of a social categorization by means of contextual cues (van 
Knippenberg, van Twuyver and Pepels, 1994). It is assumed that recent sctivation 
results in increased accessibility of the primed categorization, as a consequence of 
which it affects the use of the primed categorization in a subsequent task. 
Research on priming of adjectives yielded assimilations: without being conscious of 
the influence of the prime, subjects tend to characterize stimulus persons in a way 
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consistent with the previously primed construct (e.g. Higgins and King, 1981; Wyer 
and Srull, 1981). However, until now priming research has focused almost exclusively 
on effects of priming on the use of traits to characterize individual persons. As argued 
above, one might also predict priming effects on the use of social categorizations. 
An experimental paradigm considered useful to study categorization processes in 
social situations is the ‘Who-said-what’ or ‘name-confusion’ paradigm introduced by 
Taylor (Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff and Rudeman, 1978). Taylor et 02. asked subjects to 
listen to a tape-recording of statements made by six participants in a group discussion, 
each statement being paired with a photograph of the (black or white, or male or 
female) speaker. After the presentation of the stimulus series, the subjects were again 
presented with the statements and were asked to indicate for each statement, which 
participant was the source of this particular statement. Categorization was indicated 
by the extent to which the number of confusions subjects made between sources from 
the same category exceeded the number of confusions between sources from different 
categories. Using this paradigm, two experiments by Stangor et al. (1 992, study 1 and 2) 
investigated the effect of priming of category labels on category use. Presenting sex and 
race as ‘crossed categorizations’ (see Arcuri, 1982), it was hypothesized that priming 
would result in increased use of the primed categorization compared to the alternative 
categorization. However, in neither of these studies was the expected increase in the 
relative use of the primed categorization observed. Using the same experimental 
paradigm, van Twuyver and van Knippenberg (1 992) studied the eff‘et of priming 
either the male-female or the student-teacher classification on the relative use of the 
primed categorization. Also in this study priming failed to enhance the use of the 
categorization involved relative to the alternative categorization. 
Stangor et al. (1992) suggested a plausible explanation for the failure to obtain 
categorization effects of priming. It is possible that a ceiling effect has occurred because 
the stimulus categorizations in the above studies are chronically accessible. That is, 
categorizations like sex and race are used frequently and spontaneously in all kinds of 
situations without being primed, so that contextual cues cannot further enhance their 
use. However, as Stangor er al. argue, although short-term contextual manipulations 
may be insufficient to further increase the use of categorizations that are already used 
very frequently, it is likely that the use of categorizations that are used less habitually in 
daily life, may be more easily affected by enhancing accessibility through priming. 
The present experiment, therefore, investigates effects of priming on categorizations 
that are used less frequently and less spontaneously in daily life than race and sex, 
namely university major (psycho1ogyAaw) and university town (NijmegenlAmster- 
dam). Based on the above discussion, the following hypothesis may be formulated. We 
predict, using two ‘weak’ categorizations, that priming will lead to an increase of the 
use of the primed categorization relative to the use of the alternative categorization. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Eighty-six psychology students at the Nijmegen University (31 men, 55 women) 
participated as subjects in our study on a voluntary basis. 
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Stimulus materials 
Selection of stimulus categorizations 
Based on a pretest, university major and university town were selected as ‘weak’ 
categorizations. In this pretest (N = 78) a ‘Who said what’ paradigm was used. The 
categorizations that were studied were: student-teacher, psychology-law , Nijmegen- 
Amsterdam, CDA-D’66 (political parties in Holland), smokers-non-smokers and - 
as a standard for comparison - male-female. From these pretested social cate- 
gorizations, psychology-law and Nijmegen-Amsterdam were selected (1) because they 
are significantly weaker than the sex-categorization (that is, the difference between 
within-group confusions and between-group confusions was smaller than for the 
sex-categorization, F(1,35) = 9.63, p C 0.005 and F(1,35) = 17.48, p < 0.0001) 
respectively), and (2) because between these categorizations there was no significant 
difference in strength (F(1,40) = 1.33, n.s.). Separate tests of simple effects indicated 
that the difference between within- and between-group errors was significant for the sex 
categorization (p < 0.0001) and non-signzcant for both the psychology-law and the 
Nijmegen-Amsterdam categorizations (both F’s < 1). On the basis of the results of 
this pretest it can be assumed that both the psychology-law and the Nijmegen- 
Amsterdam categorization are indeed less accessible than the sex categorization. 
‘Who said what’ paradigm 
In the present study a name-matching task was used, based on the ‘Who said what’ 
paradigm. The general procedure in this paradigm is that subjects first observe a group 
discussion between stimulus persons belonging to different categories and, subse- 
quently, have to ascribe each discussion statement to the corresponding source. The 
dependent variable is the number of errors made in ascribing statements to sources. 
The degree to which a particular categorization is used is indicated by the number of 
times that statements are incorrectly ascribed to a source belonging to the same 
category (e.g. one law student is confused with another law student), relative to the 
number of times that statements are incorrectly ascribed to a source belonging to a 
different category (e.g. a psychology student is confused with one of the law students). 
Categorization is assumed to have occurred to the extent that the number of within- 
group confusions exceeds the number of between-group confusions. 
Procedure 
The subjects were asked to participate in two allegedly unrelated studies. The first study 
involved a paper and pencil task. Half of the subjects received a version of this task in 
which the psychology-law classification was activated, and the other half of the 
subjects received a version in which the Nijmegen-Amsterdam classification was 
activated (see ‘Priming manipulation’ below). The ‘second’ study, in which the name- 
matching task was administered, followed immediately after this task. 
Priming manipulation 
The priming manipulation directly preceded the discussion information. For half of 
the subjects only the psychology-Iaw categorization was primed while the Nijmegen- 
Amsterdam categorization remained unprimed (‘priming psychology-law’), and for 
the other half of the subjects, the Nijmegen-Amsterdam categorization was primed 
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while the psychology-law categorization remained unprimed (‘priming Nijmegen- 
Amsterdam’). Subjects in the ‘priming psychology-law’ condition received a question- 
naire in which the psychology-law categorization was activated through a series of 
questions about psychology and law students, and subjects in the ‘priming Nijmegen- 
Amsterdam’ condition received a questionnaire in which the Nijmegen-Amsterdam 
classification was activated through a series of questions about students in Nijmegen 
and Amsterdam. 
To ensure that the effects on the dependent variable are caused by the manipulation 
of priming, and not by ‘demand-characteristics’, a procedure was followed that has 
proved to be successful in avoiding such demand characteristics that might occur when 
the experimental task is consciously associated with the prime (see Wyer and Srull, 
1981). The pretask, in which the classifications were primed, was introduced to the 
subjects as a separate study that was unrelated to the actual experiment. To further 
increase the credibility of the studies being unrelated, each task was administered by a 
different experimenter. 
Because the prime is thus meant to remain unnoticed, a straightforward manipu- 
lation check for priming seems inappropriate. To check whether the subjects had 
indeed been unconscious of the influence of the prime while performing the name- 
matching task, we asked the subjects afterwards what they thought the first and the 
second studies were about, and whether they had believed there was a relationship 
between them. Because none of the subjects reported to have noticed a relation 
between the two studies, we may conclude that the effects reported in the ‘Results’ 
section are the result of the priming manipulation, and not of what subjects believed 
the experimenters expected them to do. 
Name-matching task 
Directly after having finished the pretask, each subject was seated behind a Macintosh 
computer in order to participate in the second study. Watching a written represen- 
tation of a ‘group discussion’ on the computer screen, subjects received information 
about 12 stimulus persons, each of which expressed one statement concerning a 
category-neutral issue (i.e. possible improvements of the public transport system in 
Holland). 
Presenting the psychology-law and the Nijmegen-Amsterdam categorizations as 
crossed categorizarions, the stimulus situation in the present experiment contained two 
competing categorizations which were simultaneously available to classify the dis- 
cussion participants in the name-matching task (see Arcuri, 1982). That is, the group 
memberships (psychology or law students, and students from Nijmegen or Am- 
sterdam) of the 12 stimulus persons on each of the categorization criteria were 
systematically varied, such that the categorizations were uncorrefated. Crossing the 
two categorizations resulted in a stimulus set with three psychology students from 
Nijmegen, three psychology students from Amsterdam, three law students from Nij- 
megen, and three law students from Amsterdam. On the basis of this crossed cate- 
gorization, the stimulus persons could be classified in two different ways: into six 
psychology students and six law students (university major), and at the same time into 
six students from Amsterdam and six students from Nijmegen (university town). The 
information about the group membership of the sources was given through verbal 
labels, e.g. ‘John, a psychology student from Nijmegen’. To avoid sex categorizations, 
all stimulus persons were given male first names. 
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After the presentation of all 12 stimulus persons and their statements, the statements 
were presented again, one by one, in a different order. Now, the subjects had to match 
each statement with the source of that particular statement. The statements were 
accompanied by a list of the 12 stimulus persons, represented by a number (1-12), their 
first name and their group labels. For each of the statements the subjects had to 
indicate which of the 12 persons had made the statement. The number of errors made 
in ascribing the statements to the corresponding sources, was the dependent variable. 
RESULTS 
After having applied a correction (multiplying the number of between-group errors by 
5/6) for a priori differences in probability to make within-group and between-group 
errors, the number of observed source confusions was subjected to an ANOVA with 
primed categorization (psychology-law, Nijmegen-Amsterdam) as a between-subjects 
factor, and with categorization criterion (primed, not-primed) and type of error 
(within-group, between-group) as within-subjects factors. 
In accordance with results obtained in previous studies (e.g. Taylor et al., 1978) a 
main effect of type of error was found, F( 1,84) = 33.30;~ < 0.0001. On average subjects 
made more errors within groups ( M  = 5.21) than between groups ( M  = 3.79), which 
indicates that the stimulus categorizations were in fact used in processing information 
about the stimulus persons. The central prediction of the present study is that priming 
the category labeis of one out of two available classifications leads to an increase of the 
use of the primed categorization relative to the not-primed categorization. In accord- 
ance with this prediction, the interaction effect of the within-subjects factors cate- 
gorization criterion x type of error was significant, F(1,84) = 4.3 1; p < 0.05. Since the 
three-way interaction was not significant (F(1,84) = 2.29; n.s.), this priming effect was 
not affected by the content of the prime. 
Table 1 shows the mean number of within- and between-group errors for primed and 
not-primed categorizations. As hypothesized, primed categorizations had a stronger 
effect on the difference between within-category and between-category confusions 
(Mdiff = 1.99) than the not-primed categorizations (&iff = 0.83). In order to further 
interpret this effect, we first examined whether the priming manipulation has affected 
within-group errors, between-group errors, or both. It may be expected that priming 
affects both types of errors, in that it leads to an increase in the number of within-group 
errors and to a decrease in the number of between-group errors. Indeed, as shown in 
Table 1 ,  there were more within-group errors for primed than for not-primed cate- 
gorizations (Mdiff = 0.065) and fewer between-group errors for primed than for not- 
Table 1. The interaction effect of categorization criterion x type of error on source confusions 
Type of error 
Within-group Between-group Difference score 
(within-between) 
Categorization criterion 
Primed 5.53a 3.54d 1.99 
Not-primed 4.88b 4.0F 0.83 
Means with different superscripts differ significantly at p < 0.05. 
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primed categorizations (Mdiff = -0.51). Tests for simple effects indicate that these 
differences are significant for both pairs of means. 
A second way to interpret these results is to look at the difference between within- 
and between-group errors in primed and in not-primed conditions. If this difference is 
significant in the not-primed condition, this would imply that the categorizations were 
accessible to a certain extent, even when they were not primed, suggesting that priming 
has made less accessible categorizations more accessible. This would rule out an 
alternative possibility that the categorizations were non-accessible in the first place. 
Although the difference between the number of within- and between-group errors was 
larger for the primed than for the not-primed categorizations, separate simple effects 
tests indicate that this difference was significant for both primed and not-primed 
categorizations. Thus, we may conclude that priming has made less accessible cate- 
gorizations more accessible rather than that it has made non-accessible categorizations 
accessible. In sum, the prediction that priming leads to an increase of the use of the 
primed categorization compared to the use of the alternative categorization is sup- 
ported by our data. 
DISCUSSION 
Although it has been demonstrated that priming trait adjectives affects subsequent 
descriptions of the stimulus persons (Higgins and King, 1981; Wyer and Srull, 1981), 
previous attempts to show similar effects of priming social categorizations on the use of 
these categorizations in the name confusion paradigm have failed (Stangor et af., 1992; 
van Twuyver and van Knippenberg, 1992). In the latter studies, very common cate- 
gorizations were used, such as race and sex, which are probably among the most 
habitually used social categorizations and, therefore, may be argued to be chronically 
accessible, that is, these categorizations are readily available in any social situation. 
Stangor et al. suggested that priming these chronically available social categorizations 
may not further enhance their use because of a ceiling effect. Conversely, priming 
social categorizations which are less frequently used, such as university major and 
university town, might affect the way in which social information is categorized. 
Indeed, the present study shows that priming such weakly accessible social cate- 
gorizations does enhance the use of the primed categorization in a subsequent social 
information processing task. 
When questioned in the debriefing, none of the subjects seemed to have seen through 
the deception of unrelatedness of the priming task and the name matching task. 
Therefore, it seems plausible that the obtained priming effects can be ascribed to the 
enhanced cognitive accessibility of the primed categorizations. The recent activation 
of a social categorization in the priming task probably makes this categorization 
temporarily more accessible as a cognitive structure to be used for the organization of 
complex information in memory. 
In sum, our findings underscore the notion that, although it is difficult to increase the 
use of chronically accessible categorizations through short-term contextual manipu- 
lations, categorizations that are less habitually used in daily life are much more 
sensitive to momentary changes in accessibility. Admittedly, the present study did not 
directly compare the effects of priming chronically accessible versus less accessible 
categorizations. Rather the conclusion that chronic accessibility mediates the effect of 
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priming on the use of social categorizations is, .in fact, only based on an indirect 
comparison between the present results and results from previous studies in which 
priming of chronically accessible categorizations failed to enhance the use of these 
categorizations. Thus, future research is needed to gain a more complete understand- 
ing of the potential role of chronic accessibility in mediating the effects of priming 
social categorizations, by directly varying the a priori accessibility of  the primed 
categorizations. Another potential limitation of the present study concerns the ques- 
tion how the present evidence extends to the broader context of stereotype application. 
For example, it may be interesting to see whether increased category use as a conse- 
quence of priming a social categorization corresponds with increased stereotyping of 
members of the primed categories. However, the relationship between category use as 
measured in a name-matching paradigm and the use of stereotypes is unclear. As 
shown by Miller (1 986,1988) and Taylor and Falcone (1 982), the correlation between 
category use in a name-matching task and stereotype application is weak, and cate- 
gorization of members of the stimulus categories only leads to stereotyping of those 
particular individuals, not to stereotyping of category members in general (i.e. to 
category members outside the experimental stimulus group). 
Despite these limitations, our results show that a momentary activation of a less 
accessible categorization suffices to affect social categorization in a subsequent un- 
related task. Merely due to the recency of activation, the primed categorization 
becomes more accessible in memory than alternative categorizations. Consequently, 
perceivers are more prone to use that categorization in processing information about 
persons, without being aware of the influence of the prime. 
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